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Tunisia’s efforts to democratize1 its intelligence agencies after the end of the
nondemocratic regime of Zine al-Abidine bin Ali and violent transition to
democracy in 2011. The egregious human rights abuses by the dictatorial
intelligence apparatus have prompted the democratic governments to
endeavor a transformation of the intelligence services from bin Ali’s highly
oppressive and repressive instruments into a de facto and de jure intelligence
community, in service of the emerging democracy. Under these
circumstances, the post-2011 Tunisian governments have sought to
institutionalize new and transparent agencies, under democratic civilian
control and oversight. On the other hand, Tunisia, like many other
established and developing democracies around the world, faces severe
problems of terrorism, illegal migration, as well as crime, which threaten the
country’s emerging democracy. The most recent terrorist attack on 8 July
2018 by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in the area of Aïn Soltane in the
governorate of Jendouba—which resulted in six officers of the Tunisian
security forces dead and another three wounded—clearly indicate that
Tunisia needs capable intelligence agencies.2 Tunisia needs not only
democratically accountable intelligence agencies but also intelligence agencies
that are effective in safeguarding the new democracy’s security.
It is important to find out if, less than a decade since its transition to
democracy in 2011. Tunisia is showing significant progress in developing
equally democratic and effective intelligence agencies.3 There is emerging
literature—in Arabic, French, and English—on the democratic reform of
intelligence in Tunisia which this article seeks to complement with new
insights on the current efforts to achieve a balance, or tradeoff, between
democratic civilian control and effectiveness of intelligence.4
TUNISIA’S NONDEMOCRATIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
Between 1987 and 2011, Tunisia was an authoritarian-cum-sultanistic regime
under the rule of Zine al-Abidine bin Ali—an army general in the Tunisian
intelligence agencies who came to power through a military coup.5 Unlike in
most nondemocratic regimes, where one secret service is the chief prop of
those in power, bin Ali’s rule did not rely on one distinctive intelligence
agency to stay in power. The Tunisian dictator’s political police were “a
network of organizations and individuals, inside and outside the government,
working together to collect information on anyone who could potentially
threaten the regime.”6
This intricate security apparatus relied on the surveillance and targeting
activities carried out by five main intelligence agencies with significant
powers.7 The Directorate of State Security (DSE) coordinated the
Directorate General of Special Services for General Intelligence and the
Directorate General of Technical Services for Technical Intelligence.8 Bin
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Ali’s political police employed extreme violence, surveillance, oppression,
censorship, and other human rights abuses against real or imagined
opponents of the regime—Tunisian citizens (including !emigr!es and exiles), as
well as foreign citizens.9
According to Carol Migdalovitz, Tunisia’s
security forces tortured and physically abuse prisoners, arbitrarily
arrest and detain individuals, and physically abuse, intimidate, and
harass citizens who voice public criticism of the government. The
government significantly restricts freedom of speech and of the press
and remains intolerant of public criticism, which it discourages by
physical abuse, criminal investigations, the court system, arbitrary
arrests, residential restrictions, and travel controls. It also restricts
freedom of assembly and association.10
Under bin Ali’s authoritarian regime, the intelligence agencies lacked a
legal framework, and they are not currently governed by any law.11
There was no democratic civilian control of this network, other than bin
Ali’s personal control of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the rest of
the political police components. Similar to the dictatorial control of
Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania and Francisco Franco in Spain, bin Ali
prevented the creation of any opposition power base in order to
consolidate his power.12 Tunisia’s repressive dictatorship combined the
psychological fear used by the communist regimes around the world with
the physical abuses practiced by Latin America’s military dictatorships—
and hence more violent than both.
Due to the sultanistic trait of the bin Ali regime, scholars were skeptical
that Tunisia would transition to democracy while bin Ali was in power.13
Nevertheless, bin Ali’s rule ended in 2011, following a massive popular
uprising in the country termed the “Jasmine Revolution.”14 Since the fall of
the regime, Tunisia has striven to bring about free and fair elections, garner
the support of the elites, institutionalize freedom of speech and association,
as well as other civil rights and liberties. Toward this end, Tunisia seems to
have achieved considerable democratization progress in less than a decade
since the end of bin Ali’s regime. According to the 2017 Democracy Index
provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Tunisia is a flawed democracy,
ranking sixty-ninth in the world and second in the Middle East and North
Africa region.15 Within this broader context, Tunisia has also attempted to
transform its intelligence agencies from institutions that protect the
nondemocratic regime to a community in service of the country’s citizens,
which is still a work in progress. Tunisia is yet to achieve a suitable tradeoff
between transparency/accountability and effectiveness of its post–bin Ali
intelligence agencies.
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POST-TRANSITION INTELLIGENCE REFORMS
Tunisia’s current intelligence community includes the following agencies: The
General Directorate of National Security (GDNS) and the General
Directorate of the National Guard (GDNG) within the MOI; the Defense
Intelligence and Security Agency (DISA) within the Ministry of Defense
(MOD); the General Directorate of Presidential Security and Protection of
Prominent Officials (GDPSPPO) is within the presidential office and under
the direct command of the president.16
The GDNS was created in 1967 within the MOI and without a legal
framework by the nondemocratic regime of Habib Bourguiba, in response to
the social unrest inside the country resulting from the failing economy and
Bourgiuba’s authoritarian rule.17 At that time the GDNS unified the police
and the National Guard under its umbrella.18 In 1984, bin Ali returned to
head the GDNS during an in-depth reorganization of the MOI security
services, which resulted in the separation of the GDNS and the GDNG.19
According to the 1984 presidential decree, the GDNS has three primary
missions: “maintaining public order, monitoring borders, and foreigners, and
investigating all aspects of political, economic, social and cultural fields and
reporting on them.”20 Additionally, according to the same presidential
decree, the GDNG has six missions: “maintaining public order, protecting
land and maritime borders, intervening throughout the country as a force of
2nd category, gathering intelligence in the field of politics, investigating the
social and economic fields and providing civil protections.”21 There is no
information available on the current roles of GDNS and GDNG, however.
The DISA was established in November 2014—replacing bin Ali’s military
intelligence services—by a decree issued by the head of the government,
which replaced the Directorate of Military Security with DISA. DISA is a
“public institution of administrative character that enjoys legal status and
financial independence.”22 Its primary mission entails intelligence collection
on potential threats to the armed forces and the security of the country
in general.23
The GDPSPPO was created in 1984 within GDNS under the MOI.24
However, after bin Ali’s coup in 1987, he issued a presidential decree to
remove the GDPSPPO from the MOI and placed it under his direct
command.25 This directorate was tasked with protecting the regime; for this
purpose, it was well armed and equipped with a separate intelligence system
called the Presidential Security Sub-Directorate of Intelligence (PSSDI) to
gather intelligence critical for the regime’s security.26 Under those terms, the
PSSDI collected information from all governmental departments.27 The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs includes intelligence functions as well, yet little
open-source information exists on these functions.
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Tunisia does not have a clear and robust legal basis for the roles and
oversight of the intelligence sector. These agencies operate most of the time in
obscurity under the shield of some ministries.28 In 2014, Tunisia adopted a
new constitution; however, only several articles deal with internal security,
and their main focus is the military.29 Article 19 of the Constitution deals
with security forces to include police and other internal security
organizations, “responsible for maintaining security and public order,
ensuring the protection of individuals, institutions, and property, and
ensuring the enforcement of the law.”30 While the constitution addresses the
security apparatus mission and even stipulates that the security institutions
need to respect individual freedoms and remain apolitical, it does not address
security sector governance.31 Mainly, the lack of civilian expertise on defense
and security played a vital issue at not properly addressing security legislation
and endeavor to conduct oversight.32 The constitution does not, however,
address the intelligence agencies; reports indicate that the National
Constituent Assembly “members’ security illiteracy prevented them from
addressing changes to the sector, which is crucial for a working
democracy.”33 In the summer of 2015, the parliament enacted Law No. 26 on
the Fight Against Terrorism, which stipulates the conditions for tapping the
communications as part of criminal investigations relating to a
terrorist threat.34
DEMOCRATIC REFORM OF INTELLIGENCE
The post-dictatorship governments have taken several steps to democratize
the intelligence agencies: abolishing some agencies, creating new institutions,
assigning new roles and missions to the newly created agencies, devising
domestic intelligence coordination and interagency processes, and developing
mechanisms for international intelligence cooperation and sharing.
One of the first reform steps undertaken by the Tunisian government after
the revolution was the abolishment of the nefarious DSE.35 Critics of this
change argue this course of action was detrimental to the effectiveness of the
post-2011 intelligence community because of the critical role played by DSE
in liaising between the intelligence and security agencies, filtering
information, and sharing analysis.36 Moreover, the Tunisian government
disbanded the Directorate General of Anti-Terrorism Prevention and the
Joint Committee for Intelligence and Border Control run by the Central
Directorate of General Intelligence.37 According to Privacy International,
Tunisia immediately “faced … a serious security crisis, having to strengthen
its intelligence capabilities in the face of mounting jihadist attacks and
security challenges, while also ensuring that past abuses would not
be repeated.”38
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On this background, in 2011, a group of experts, led by Lazhar ‘Akarmi
who was the MOI in charge of reform, released a white paper with a vision
for security sector reform. The white book discusses the intelligence reform in
its last chapter.39 Nevertheless, the document failed to promote the principles
of democratic governance of the security sector; instead, it sought to
strengthen the operational capabilities of the security sector to handle the
country’s security challenges.40 In addition, critics of the white paper
immediately noted that despite the fact that “the report was prepared by the
previous transitional government as an MOI input for the work of the
Constituent Assembly,” it seemed “unlikely that the new government will
adopt its assessment and recommendations.”41 So far, these ideas and
recommendations have not yet put into practice.
By the spring of 2012, the Tunisian government embarked on the creation
of a new intelligence service called the National Intelligence Agency, tasked
with national defense and security. This agency is part of the MOI. Since
2014, and particularly after the terrorist attacks of 2015, Tunisia has
augmented the military’s antiterrorism role, which included the creation in
2015 of the DISA, whose financial resources come from independent sources
as compared to the rest of the armed forces. Legal subject matter experts who
criticize the DISA’s legal basis argue that the decree is too broad and ill-
defined; there is no clear definition of what is considered as “potential
threats” and the “country’s security in general.”42 Furthermore, this decree is
the result of an executive effort rather than a legislative process, therefore
rendering this decree without a clear legislative framework or oversight to
ensure transparency and accountability in military intelligence activities.43
Significantly, since 2011, Tunisia has had five different interior ministers,
two successive secretaries in charge of Security Sector Reform, and one
minister within the MOI in charge of security.44 The multiple leadership
change in the MOI hampered the efforts at reforming the intelligence
agencies and pursuing a consistent reform agenda. However, on 16 December
2014, the Tunisian government formed an intelligence fusion center under the
auspices of the MOI with the mission to deal with the threat of terrorism and
organized crime.45 The center includes representatives of the ministries of
defense, finance, foreign affairs, customs, and the prison administration.46
In December 2016, the Tunisian government decided to reform its
National Intelligence Agency in the aftermath of the assassination, reportedly
by the Israeli intelligence community, of the Tunisian drone expert
Mohammed Al-Zawahiri, who was also affiliated with the military wing of
Hamas—the Qassam Brigades.47 A statement issued by the head of the
Tunisian government announced that the president’s office presented the
Tunisian government with a study to reform the intelligence agency’s
missions to include collecting information, coordinate among all intelligence
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agencies, control the strategic options in the fields of gathering intelligence,
and respectively analysis, in addition to planning international cooperation in
the field of intelligence and developing the national intelligence plan.48 The
center would be domestically focused but cooperate within the frameworks of
regional security programs with counterparts from neighboring countries.
Under these circumstances, in early 2017, Tunisia created the National
Intelligence Centre under Government Decree no. 71 of 19 January 2017, an
intelligence fusion center that facilitates counterterrorism intelligence-sharing
among “agencies that had plagued the country’s counter-terrorism efforts
since the revolution.”49 Its main tasks include: providing analyses, risk and
threat assessments for the prime minister and the head of the National
Security Council (NSC); drawing strategic guidelines and priorities for the
NSC; and devising the national intelligence strategy and seeing it through
implementation.50 In addition, in July 2017, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) revealed its intent to establish an “Intelligence Fusion
Center” in Tunisia. According to Privacy International, the fusion center—
which has not been created yet—“will serve as an intelligence-gathering
outpost for the transatlantic alliance.”51 Indeed, NATO’s “desire to establish
an intelligence bureau in Tunisia aims to facilitate their mission in the region
since their proximity to hotbeds of tension makes it easier for them to control
terrorist gangs and speeds up the spread of chaos in Algeria after stirring it
up in the Tunisian south through enabling a Daesh terrorist incursion in it
and then in Algeria.”52 The creation of this fusion center would benefit
Tunisia’s intelligence agencies in terms of strengthening expertise, improving
sharing and cooperation among the existing agencies, and improved
analytical products.
Since 2011, the Tunisian governments have striven to improve the
interagency coordination, cooperation, and sharing among the various
intelligence agencies, as well as between the Tunisian intelligence services
and their international counterparts.53 On 12 August 2017, the cooperation
among intelligence and security sector agencies led to the dismantling of a
terrorist group and stopping of a terror plot in southern Tunisia. It was the
fruitful cooperation between “the anti-terror squad of El Gorjani, Tunisia,
following an intelligence operation by the Anti-Terror Judicial Pole” that
has made this operation successful.54 In addition, in September 2015, the
Tunisian Intelligence Agency and law enforcement arrested eleven people
alleged to belong to a jihadist terror group that was trafficking fighters to
Syria.55 According to Adnkronos International, “[O]ne of the suspects were
plotting attacks against prominent figures, the interior ministry said. The
alleged cell used fake documents to dispatch jihadists to Syria in
coordination with groups of Tunisian and Algerian smugglers, the
ministry said.”56
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CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
As part of the democratization of Tunisia’s intelligence apparatus, several
layers of control and oversight have been codified. Currently, Tunisia’s
democratic control and monitoring of the intelligence agencies is carried out
by executive, legislative, judicial, and informal—most notably, media—
institutions.
At the executive branch level, control/oversight is the prerogative of the
president and prime minister through the NSC, as well as civilian-led
ministries. The NSC was created in 1987 under bin Ali’s rule with the mission
to “collect, study, analyze, and assess all information and security data
related to national security within the realms of domestic policy, foreign
affairs, and defense policy in order to protect the state’s internal and external
security and consolidate its foundations.”57 The NSC has seven specialized
committees to include intelligence, national defense, civil defense, food
security, transportation security, infrastructure security, and energy
security.58 A presidential decree signed in 1990 placed the intelligence
committee, which includes representatives from the Defense Ministry, the
Foreign Affairs Ministry, and the MOI, under the direction of the Interior
Ministry, which in turn gave the MOI an exclusive role in the country’s
intelligence.59 Based on a presidential decree signed in 1988, GDNS’s general
director obtained the status of permanent member in the NSC.60 The
post–Arab Spring NSC has shifted its focus from coordinating political
police-related activities to strategic coordination of national security–related
issues and courses of action. The NSC meets at least once every three
months, and whenever necessary; in addition, the council convenes
immediately in times of crisis and remains in session until the cause of the
meeting is resolved.61
The civilian-led Ministry of National Defense—mostly a civilian
organization, tasked with implementing military services–related policy
decisions—is tasked with control/oversight of the armed forces and
intelligence agencies. 62 There is virtually no available information on how
the MOD and the minister of defense conduct this oversight over the military
intelligence services. Similarly, control/oversight over the MOI intelligence
agencies is the prerogative of the MOI, yet it does not appear to take place in
practice. Moreover, the MOI itself seems to reject oversight on the grounds
of national security. Indeed, as Anthony Dworkin and Fatim-Zohra El Malki
observe, “the ministry remains resistant to … oversight … the rise of
security threats in Tunisia in the last few years has made reform of the
Ministry of the Interior more difficult, as many officials continue to believe
that police transparency and accountability would be an impediment to
fighting terrorism.”63 It seems, as Hanlon notes, that the “Ministry of
Interior is the proverbial black box of Tunisia’s security sector.”64 She further
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highlights that the MOI organizational chart is classified, which, in her view,
“complicates the task of mapping the internal security structures controlled
by it, as well as the oversight mechanisms within the ministry.”65 In addition,
there is no oversight of the handling of the authoritarian-era secret police
files, which are currently in the custody of the MOI. Specifically, because it is
not clear who handles the files, how secure these files are (e.g., former MOI
employees noted that some data had been burned), and the law places a fifty-
year ban on the publication of these documents.66 Under these
circumstances, the former intelligence files—which contain fabricated and
hence potentially damaging information on various current and future
Tunisian leaders—may quickly become sources of political and personal
vendettas.67
Legislative oversight is the prerogative of several committees in the
Tunisian parliament, since 2014, when the Tunisian Parliament divided an
old defense committee into two. The first is the Committee on Administrative
Organization and the Affairs of the Armed Forces (COAAFA), which
oversees the public sector, administrative decentralization, and the military;
the second committee is on Security and Defense (CSD) to monitor security
and defense–related issues including “holding discussions and hearings with
government security officials to implement national security policies or to
hold them accountable.”68
The CSD committee can “research and suggest reforms to COAAFA and
help them draft proposals regarding both military and policy institutions, but
cannot vote on COAAFA’s bills before they head to the parliament.”69
Former colonel Mahmoud Mezoughy states that “members of the committee
are not qualified enough to reform the sector.”70 Observers point out that the
government’s approach to security intelligence and security agencies has been
reactive to security threats inside the country. For example, like in other new
democracies,71 hearings by the committee have been in reaction to a media
fire alarm: “an emergency or a major event that generated discussion in the
media and among citizens.”72 Indeed, media alarms have prompted the
committees or even several parliamentarians to start investigations, related to
illegal wiretappings in particular.73 In sum, legislative oversight of the
intelligence agencies remains a work in progress, and the members of the
parliament committees charged with the supervision of the intelligence
agencies seem to be willing to strengthen their effectiveness in conducting
oversight. For instance, in November 2018, a group of Parliamentarians from
the Tunisian National Coalition party, led by Leila Shetawi, presented a new
legislative initiative—named “Proposed Law on the Establishment of a Legal
Framework for Intelligence Services”—and she referred this proposed law to
the COAAFA for review.74 Shetawi explains that the balance between
national security and citizen freedom can be achieved through creating
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oversight committees by the judicial and legislative branches, in addition to
administrative and financial resources oversight.75
On 11 January 2019, the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the
Armed Forces (DCAF) organized a workshop on legislative oversight of
intelligence for the COAAFA and CSD members to assist COAAFA
members, who discuss and debate the draft law on the intelligence
community to assess and evaluate the bill effectively.76 As DCAF highlights,
“[T]he workshop aimed to stimulate reflection on the questions regarding the
legal framework and the oversight of the intelligence community, in
particular by: presenting concepts and general data about the intelligence
community; giving a general overview of the organization of intelligence
community by presenting different foreign experiences; presenting
parliamentary oversight practices of the intelligence community; as well as
providing preliminary analysis of the proposed legislation.”77
A judicial review consists of interpretation by the judiciary of the legal
framework pertaining to intelligence operations, as well as providing
authority for intrusive actions, such as wiretapping and other types of
electronic communication surveillance. In line with Law No. 26, surveillance
“must be warranted by a judicial order issued by either an Investigative
Judge or the Prosecutor of the Republic. The order must identify the specific
types of communications subject to interception and/or monitoring for a
period that cannot exceed four months every time it is granted, and that can
only be renewed once.”78 The law stipulates that investigators must always
keep a written record of their surveillance; failure to receive prior judicial
authorization for interception of communications may result in up to one
year in prison.79 The Technical Agency for Telecommunications, created
through Decree No. 2013-4506 in November 2013 under the Ministry of
Communication and Information Technologies, “is the technical arm of the
judicial branch. In practice, it conducts communications surveillance
operations on behalf of the prosecution to collect electronic data that can
later serve as evidence before the courts.”80 These practices reveal
infringements of the privacy rights in Tunisia and opponents called on the
government to review the legislation. For example, critics scold poor judicial
oversight. Indeed, human rights watchdogs criticized the decision of the
Tunisian government in May 2016 to install “over 1,000 surveillance cameras
in 300 ‘electronic checkpoints’ all across the capital city, Tunisia, and in
‘sensitive’ governorates across the country in Kasserine, Kef, Jendouba and
Sidi Bouzid,” noting that “little is known of any oversight mechanism
regarding this measure.”81 As a result of criticism, a law on the protection of
personal data was enacted on 25 May 2018, replacing an old law (Law No.
63), which harmonizes the Tunisian legislation with Convention 108 of the
Council of Europe for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the
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Automatic Processing of Personal Data to which Tunisia is party.82 The law
“requires private data controllers to apply for authorization from the INPDP
prior to processing personal data or transferring it abroad. The INPDP is
also mandated to investigate privacy violations and to report those violations
to the government. It can also bring violators before the courts.”83
The intelligence agencies’ personnel, practices, and operations have also
been under informal scrutiny by civil society—an outcome of Tunisia’s
endeavors to foster freedom of the media since 2011. Tunisia’s press became
free in November 2011, when the bin Ali regime’s restrictive Press Code was
abrogated and replaced by Decree No 2011-115 Relating to Freedom of the
Press, Printing, and Publishing.84 In addition, Decree-Law No. 41 on the
Access to Administrative Documents of Government Bodies entered into
force on 26 May 2011.85 The law allows citizens to access “all documents
produced or received by government agencies as part of their public service
duty, whatever the date of the said documents, their form or medium.”86
Freedom of press was reaffirmed in the 2014 Constitution, which stipulates
that “[T]he state guarantees the right to information and the right of access
to information and communication networks.”87 An additional success for
the freedom of the press and access to information was the enactment of Law
No. 2016-22 on the Right of Access to Information, which was finally
adopted by parliament in March 2016, which led to the creation in
September 2017 of an independent body that oversees the correct
implementation of the law—the Instance Nationale d’Acc"es "a
l’Information.88 Under these circumstances, Tunisian civil society and media
have become very engaged in calling for security-sector reform with a
particular focus on reforming internal security agencies, particularly the
internal police. On multiple instances, security sector reform activists in
Tunisia called for truth commissions, justice in cases of abuse and torture,
civilian oversight of the police, and an overhaul of the security apparatus.89
And, as noted above, its fire alarms have led to responsive government. For
example, civil society and the media have relentlessly covered instances of old
oppressive and repressive political police practices, in particular during the
prolonged state of emergency in 2015 (in spite of improvement in security),
which indicates that the government is not entirely committed to personal
freedoms as claimed. 90 Indeed, according to Jebnoun, “[U]sing emergency
powers, the security forces have carried out thousands of raids and house
searches without judicial authorization, and placed dozens of people under
assigned residence orders. … [T]he use of torture and other ill-treatment is
still widespread in Tunisian detention centers, especially those operated by
the Ministry of the Interior’s terrorism investigation brigades.”91 A more
recent example includes media’s exposure to an illegal espionage and
financial crimes and bribery situation in 2018, which has led to “the arrest of
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a deputy director within the Ministry of State Property, an advisor to the
Minister of Health, and the issuing of an arrest warrant against a Ministry of
Tourism executive.”92
CHALLENGING DEMOCRATIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE
Despite significant progress with regard to democratic institution-building,
Tunisia’s endeavors to democratize its newly created intelligence agencies
have been less than successful. Several challenges obstruct the democratic
reform of intelligence in Tunisia. Among these, the most daunting is the
perilous security environment surrounding Tunisia. The country is facing
security threats of transnational origin, including terrorism, organized crime,
and political assassinations.93 The protracted civil war in Libya, along with
the rise of the Islamic state in the region heavily contributed to the internal
security threat in Tunisia. On 6 June 2013 an improvised explosive device
explosion near Jebel ech Chambi mountain, attributed to an al Qaeda cell in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Al-Sharia, killed two Tunisians and
wounded two others. This terrorist attack marked the first of many other
attacks by AQIM near the ech-Chambi mountain. In the summer of 2013,
the Army chief of staff, General Rashid Ammar, retired his position and in a
television interview acknowledged that the difficulties facing the Tunisian
Armed Forces in fighting against Islamist insurgents at the ech-Chambi
mountain were a “result of the intelligence impotence and the lack of
cooperation between the country’s intelligence services tasked with fighting
transnational threats.”94 On 18 March 2015, AQIM attacked the Bardo
National Museum in Tunisia, killing twenty-two and wounding fifty. On 26
June of the same year, terrorists targeted two tourist hotels in Sousse.95 In
November 2015, a bomb hit a bus carrying Tunisian Presidential Guard
officers who ensured the protection of the Tunisian president.96 Frequent
terrorist attacks like these challenge the ability of the intelligence agencies of
developed democracies—which have had time and resources to build and
transform their intelligence agencies—to avert serious security threats
effectively. Such attacks affect emerging democracies like Tunisia—which has
had only a little time to bring about de facto and de jure changes in the
profession of intelligence in terms of a roadmap for intelligence, new roles,
missions, priorities, interagency processes, resources, and personnel—even
more. In this connection, as Dworkin and El Malki note, “dramatic shifts
and agents’ uncertainty about how to operate in the new, democratic
environment led to poor morale in the security services. As a consequence,
these organizations were weak and disorganized at a time when security
threats to Tunisia were growing.”97 Ultimately, as Dworkin and El Malki
point out, “[T]he continued instability plaguing the country and the resultant
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need for an operational security apparatus was another element that likely
prevented the … government from introducing reform.”98
The main internal challenge to the intelligence democratization in Tunisia
has been the complexity of the reform itself, which has been overwhelming the
politicians and hence discouraged them from undertaking intelligence
reforms. As Jebnoun stresses, the Tunisian “government was likely deterred
by the complexity of the reforms needed and the difficulty of overcoming the
heavy legacies, of the authoritarian regime.”99
An obstinate challenge and obstacle to democratic intelligence reform in
Tunisia is the legacy of the past—a stigma associated with the egregious
human rights abuses by the political police of the nondemocratic regime—
which equates to mistrust and even hatred toward intelligence agencies.
Indeed, according to Dworkin and El Malki, “[T]he revolution left the
security services in a difficult and ambiguous position because the Tunisian
public associated them with the former regime’s repressive political
system.”100 Other reports reveal that “small units within the General
Directive for Public Safety—an umbrella organization that includes the
traffic police, public safety police, crowd control police, and others—still
report on the political activities of citizens, as well as daily activities of
diplomats and foreign journalists.”101 Mistrust in intelligence agencies
negatively affects the ability of these services to recruit new personnel. When
old personnel continued to staff the post-authoritarian intelligence agencies,
they continued to conduct political police practices, which aggravate the lack
of the population’s trust in these organizations. For example, after the
terrorist attack in November 2015, the president declared a state of
emergency for a month and appointed a bin Ali political police officer—
Abderrahmen Ben Hadja—as head of the “State Security,” which spread fear
among the population of the reincarnation of the old-era political police.102
As a matter of fact, the rooted authoritarian legacy and the old ways of a
police state persist in the intelligence security agencies, as Jebnoun explains:
The NSC operates in a “Soviet Politburo” fashion way. … [R]ather
than questioning and identifying challenges by “speaking truth to
power” in a professional fashion, these (intelligence) services tend to
support politics as “intelligence to please.” In fact, the unspoken rules
of the Tunisian security bureaucracy are that the high-ranking officials
within the intelligence and security apparatus have incommensurable
power over both the flow of information and their subordinates. Thus,
to avoid jeopardizing their ability and their career, these senior
intelligence and security officials opportunistically embrace the official
political line of policymakers while they allow their intelligence and
security services to operate based on political stereotype, where
profiling targets driven by baseless assumptions is still a primary piece
of their modus operandi.103
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Legacy of the past perpetuates reluctance and resistance to reform from
both the intelligence agencies themselves and the politicians. Indeed, an EU
report observes that the intelligence agencies “marginalize … calls for them
to be held accountable for human rights abuses.”104 The same report also
points out how the old recycled personnel—the old boys still in place—who
hold leadership positions in the post-authoritarian security institutions are
“not clearly committed to reform.”105 What is more, citizens in Tunisia fear
that the president may invoke combating terrorism to consolidate his
authority to the detriment of the prime minister, when the president declared
in 2017 that the NSC created several standing committees to address health,
education, energy, and transport-related security issues—which resulted in
concerns “that security would provide a pretext for the development of a
parallel government centered on the presidency.” 106 Naturally, such a parallel
government would augment the powers of several—if not all—
intelligence agencies.
The lack of intelligence and security expertise among politicians has also
obstructed intelligence reform—from developing a legal basis for intelligence
to carrying out de facto and de jure democratic civilian oversight over all
agencies. Indeed, as Jebnoun notes, the Tunisian “authorities showed little
ability to draft security legislation, conduct effective oversight of security
operations, or cultivate confidence between Tunisians and their security
forces. They also failed to investigate complaints of human rights abuses or
perform audits on security spending. Essentially, the security arrangement
under Bin Ali, in which the security sector was the domain of the executive
power, is still in place in the post-authoritarian era.”107
Among the internal impediments to intelligence democratization in Tunisia
is also the lack of transparency with regard to the structure, budgets, and
missions of intelligence agencies hindering an effective reform agenda.108
Ultimately, the ambiguity of Tunisia’s system of government—neither
presidential, nor semi-presidential, nor parliamentary, but mixed—is another
factor that obstructs intelligence reform. According to Jebnoun,
[S]uch ambiguity is reflected in how the tasks performed by the
president and the prime minister are delineated in the constitution. For
example, article 77 states that the president is responsible for setting
general policies in the realms of defense and foreign and national
security, but only after consulting with the prime minister, whereas
article 89 grants the prime minister the right to select the ministers of
foreign affairs and defense—but only after consulting with the
president.109
All these ambiguities cause delays in decision making, in particular in terms
of roles and missions, prerogatives, and interagency.
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INTELLIGENCE REFORMS: CONTROL AND EFFECTIVENESS
Some moderate progress in the democratization of intelligence has occurred.
However, reform and development of Tunisia’s intelligence community
should be rated “low” for control and “low–medium” for effectiveness, by
Bruneau and Matei metrics.110 Low values were assigned for a lack of
implementation of any of the metrics/requirements; medium values, for
inconsistent attempts to implement the metrics; and high values, for full
application and discussion for further improvement. A summary of findings,
in terms of requirements for civilian control and requirements for
effectiveness, is presented in Table 1.
Requirements for Control
Tunisia scores “low” in the Institutional Control Mechanisms category. Since
the end of the dictatorship, Tunisia’s civilian elites have created several
control mechanisms for intelligence, including enacting an intelligence-related
legal framework, creating civilian-led institutions (such as the MOD), as well
as providing modest strategic guidance and prioritization of intelligence roles
and missions through each ministry and the NSC. These mechanisms,
however, have not defined the roles and tasks of each agency clearly.
In the “Oversight” category, Tunisia scores “low.” Tunisia’s policy makers
have created formal oversight mechanisms, such as the parliamentarian
committees and judicial review mechanisms for intrusive intelligence
activities. Nonetheless, these oversight bodies have been less than perfect in
conducting oversight—either through police patrolling or reacting to fire
alarms sounded by civil society and the media. In addition, the legal
framework for intelligence is virtually inexistent, which permits intelligence
abuses and oppression. The informal oversight by the media and human
rights watchdog organizations, however, seems to keep the citizens informed
on intelligence transgressions and abuses. Indeed, the press and civil society
have often exposed misconduct in intelligence or lack of actual reform, but
even if their fire alarms have occasionally successfully compelled the formal
oversight mechanisms to investigate transgressions, punish wrongdoing, and
bring about real reforms, they have not been as constant as in other new
democracies (e.g., Romania or Spain).111
Tunisia also scores “low” in the “Professional Norms” category. Tunisia’s
post-dictatorship intelligence agencies have yet to become professional—in
terms of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness—in the Huntingtonian
sense.112 Tunisia needs more robust recruitment, education, training, and
career development processes for new intelligence services. According to a
report by Agency Tunis Afrique Press, “[T]he European Parliament also
emphasizes the need to reform the intelligence services of Tunisia, while
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respecting the rule of law and conventions on human rights.”113 The newly
created School of Intelligence and Military Security in Tunisia, tasked with
the education and training of future intelligence officers, may help develop
the intelligence profession further.114 In addition, the external support and
assistance—in terms of financial resources and professional intelligence
education and training—provided by the United States, France, and the
European Union to strengthen the professionalism of the intelligence services
may improve this score in the long term.
Requirements for Effectiveness
Tunisia scores “low–medium” in the “Plan” category. Tunisia’s policy
makers developed several successive strategic documents after the transition
to democracy, including the white paper and the counterterrorism strategy.
Nevertheless, Tunisia’s politicians seem to lack a strategic vision with regard
to the role and place of intelligence in the country’s new democracy.
Tunisia scores “low–medium” in the “Institutions” category. The legacy of
the past has obstructed interagency coordination, cooperation, and sharing.
The NSC is working well, but the attempts by the president to augment its
power raises questions. In addition, despite successful interagency practices,
“[T]he slow pace of reform has meant that silos within the ministry still tend
to communicate poorly with one another—although there has been some
progress in this area since 2015.115
It is difficult—based on the available information—to provide an accurate
score for Tunisia in the “Resources” category. Our estimate is that Tunisia
scores “low.” However, the external support and assistance provided by the
United States, France, and the European Union may improve this score in
the long term.
Overall, Tunisia scores low in “Control” and low–medium in
“Effectiveness.” Indeed, as Dworkin and El Malki note, “European officials
generally agree that Tunisia’s security services have considerably improved
their capacity to prevent and respond to terrorist threats since 2015.
Nevertheless, the overhaul of Tunisia’s security and counter-terrorism
strategy and structures has failed to resolve some problems and even created
a few new difficulties.”116









or strategy Institutions Resources
Tunisia’s score Low–medium Low Low Low–medium Low–medium Low
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CONCLUSION
Institutionalizing democratic reform of intelligence in Tunisia has been half-
hearted. Indeed, as Dworkin and El Malki observe, “Tunisia formulates
security policy against a background of complex and incomplete political
transition, in which a constitution based on the principle of accountability
coexists with a security sector that is in many areas reforming slowly, if at
all.”117 Likewise, Jebnoun explains that, although some progress has been
made in terminating the MOI’s interference in the electoral process, opacity
remains a main feature of the security sector—including the internal security
forces and intelligence agencies.118 While the current Tunisian intelligence
agencies are becoming more effective in dealing with the security threats, they
are still obscure and lack robust democratic civilian control. In this
connection, as Grewal points out, “[A] still-unreformed security sector is an
impediment to democracy, security, and sustainable development.”119
Under these circumstances, Tunisia has yet to find an appropriate
intelligence–democracy trade-off. To find it, policy makers must press for—
and practice—more robust guidance and direction to the roles and missions
of the intelligence agencies; more endeavors to professionalize the agencies;
and more effective formal oversight. In addition, the media and civil society
must remain informal watchdogs of intelligence personnel’s activities and
practices. On the other hand, Tunisia has not even celebrated a decade since
the transition to democracy. Empirical evidence from other developing
democracies reveals that it takes decades until these new democracies find
their trade-off between security and democracy, and even then, it remains a
work in progress.120 In this connection, because Tunisia seems to be
committed to following a democratic trajectory, in time it may improve its
quest for a suitable intelligence and democracy trade-off.
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